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These briefings have been drafted by the Parliament Secretariat Task Force on 
the Intergovernmental Conference. Their purpose is to gather together, in an 
organized, summary form, the proposals and suggestions which the authorities 
in the Member States, the Union's institutions and specialist commentators 
have put forward on the issues likely to be on the IGC 96 agenda. 
Briefings will be updated as negotiations proceed. 
Already out: 
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26 Europol 
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28 Combating fraud 
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36 The 1996 IGC ·and the enlargement of the EU 
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BRIEFING 
ON 
THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
AND THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU 
1. Introduction/Conference agenda 
At ·the Copenhagen summit (21/22 June 1993), the E-uropean Council offered full 
membership of the EU to the Heads of State and· Government·of the· associated 
. Central and Eastern European states on condition of their full acceptance of the 
"acquis communautaire" and the EU • s ability to cope with new Member States. 
According to the European Council, membership requires in particular that the 
prospective Member State has stable institutions which guarantee democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence 
of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union. Moreover, membership presupposes the 
candidate· s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to 
the aims of political integration, economic and monetary union. 
This position has been reconfirmed at the summits of Essen, Cannes and Madrid in 
December 1994, June 1995 and December 1995 respectively. Moreover, at the 
Essen summit an accession strategy for Central and Eastern European states was 
produced and in Cannes a White Paper concerning their integration into the internal 
market of the EU was approved by the Council of Ministers. 
In the meantime Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, 
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic have applied for full membership. Slovenia has 
announced its intention to do so. 
Following the political decision of the European Council of Madrid of December 1995 
it is expected that the Council of Ministers will decide to commence accession 
negotiations six months after the end of the IGC, after having consulted the 
Commission and the European Parliament as required by Article 0 of the Treaty on 
EU. 
According to the Treaty on EU, Eastern enlargement has not been scheduled for 
discussion during the 1996 IGC. However, the Essen European Council has pointed 
out that it will be one of the main tasks of the 1996 IGC. to prepare the Union for 
further enlargement. In order to prepare itself for enlargement, institutional reform and 
a re-evaluation of the decision-making process wifl be high on the agenda on the 
19961GC. . 
Furthermore it is to be expected that the IGC will also consider a number of other key 
problems related to enlargement (impact on the CAP and on structural policy, 
increased costs, etc.) as well as the implementation of the strategy to prepare the 
Eastern countries for accession. 
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2. Positions of the EU Institutions 
2.1 Position of the European Council and the Council of the Union 
Sources: Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Madrid of December 
1995; Draft Mandate for the 1996 IGC of 16 January 1996 (Council of the Union); 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Turin of 29 March 1996. 
The European Council has pointed out in Madrid that one of the main areas 
where results should be achieved is enabling the Union to function better-and 
preparing it for enlargement~ The IGG ·should .thus examine the ways and 
means to improve the efficiency and democracy of the Union. The Union must 
also preserve its decision-making ability after further enlargement. Given the 
number and variety of the countries -involved, this calls for changes to the 
structure and workings of the institutions. It may also mean that flexible 
solutions will have to be found, fully respecting the single institutional 
framework and the "acquis communautaire". 
"Following the conclusion of the IGC and in the light of its outcome ... , the 
Council will, at the earliest opportunity, take the necessary decisions for 
launching the accession negotiations. The European Council hopes that the 
preliminary stage of negotiations will coincide with the start of negotiations 
with Cyprus and Malta six months after the conclusion of the 1996 IGC." 
In Turin the European Council has emphasised that future enlargement, which 
represents a historic mission and a great opportunity for Europe, is also a 
challenge for the Union in all its dimensions. In this perspective, institutions, 
as well as their functioning, and procedures have to be improved in order to 
preserve its capacity for action, while maintaining the "acquis communautaire" 
and developing it and also respecting the balance between the institutions. It 
is essential to sustain the very nature of European construction, which has to 
preserve and develop its features of democracy, efficiency, solidarity, 
cohesion, transparency and subsidiarity. 
In order to improve the Union· s institutions, and also in view of preparing the future 
enlargement, the Heads of State or Government stress the need to look for the best 
means to ensure that they function with greater efficiency, coherence and legitimacy. 
The conference will have to examine: 
the most effective means of simplifying legislative procedures and making 
them clearer and more transparent; 
the possibility of widening the scope of codecision in truly legislative matters; 
the question of the roie of the European Parliament besides its legislative 
powers, as well as its composition and the uniform procedure for its election. 
The IGC should equally examine how and to what extent national parliaments 
could, also collectively, better contribute to the Union· s tasks. 
As regards the Council, whose functioning must be improved, the IGC should address 
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the questions of the extent of majority voting, the weighting of votes and the 
threshold for qualified majority decisions. 
The Conference will have to examine how the Commission can fulfil its fundamental 
functions with greater efficiency, having regard to its composition and taking into 
account its representativity. 
The Conference should examine whether and how to improve the role and functioning 
of the European Court of Justice and Court of Auditors. It should also examine how 
to achieve greater clearness and quality of legislation and ways and means of a more 
effective fight against fraud. 
The Heads of State or Government ask the Conference to examine whether and how 
to introduce rules either of a general nature or in specific areas in order to enable a 
certain number of Member States to develop a strengthened cooperation, open to all, 
compatible with Union · s objectives, while preserving the "acquis communautaire", 
avoiding discrimination and distortions of competition and respecting the single 
institutional framework. 
2.2 Position of the Commission 
Sources: Report of 10 May 1995 on the operation of the Treaty on EU; Commission 
position of 6 December 1995 on the Reflection Group report; Commission opinion of 
28 February 1996 "Reinforcing Political Union and preparing for enlargement" 
With regard to enlargement the Commission considers that the Conference will 
have to address three issues: 
a) the institutional implications of the increased number of Member States; 
b) the need to eschew unanimous voting; 
c) the incorporation of a system of flexibility, enabling the Union to move 
ahead ·without being held back by its slowest members. 
In order to adapt the institutions the Commission proposes several institutional 
changes: 
a) The Commission 
The Commission takes the view that, in the context of enlargement, the 
number of its Members should be ·reduced to one per Member State. 
The Commission is aware that its composition and structure will have 
to be re-examined, when the number of Member States is further 
increased. The Conference should fix an appropriate procedure for doing 
this. 
b) The Council 
The Conference should examine various ways of extending the scope of 
the Presidency· s powers of action, and the order of rotation of the half-
yearly periods. 
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The Commission considers that, in order to maintain the existing 
balance, there is justification, when enlargement comes, for either 
adapting the weighting of votes or introducing a new system which 
makes a reference to both a majority of the Member States and a 
majority of the Union · s population. 
c) The European Parliament 
Parliament itself proposed limiting its membership to 700. The 
Commission agrees. 
The Commission takes the view that the EU must make it possible -to have 
forms of coo_peration or integration between those of its ~embers wishing to 
progress faster and farther in the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty on 
EU. In the Commission· s view, however, this must be done within a single 
institutional framework and must centre on a common objective. The 
Commission is opposed to a "Europe a Ia carte". Moreover, the requisite 
flexibility will have to be guided by the following principles, so as to guarantee 
the unity of the Union: 
a) compatibility with the objectives of the Union; 
b) opportunity for other Member States which are willing and able to join 
at any time; 
c) safeguarding the single market and the policies accompanying it. 
The Commission, subject to review by the European Court of Justice, 
will have to ensure that the principles set out above are respected. 
2.3 Position of the Parliament 
Sources: Bourlanges and Martin report on the functioning of the Treaty on EU with 
a view to the 1996 IGC (adopted on 17 May 1995); Resolution of 14 December 
1995 on the agenda for the 1996 IGC with a view to the Madrid European Council; 
Resolution of 13 March 1996 on the basis of the Dury/Maij-Weggen report on (i) 
Parliament· s opinion on the convening of the IGC, and (ii) evaluation of the work of 
the Reflection Group and definition of the political priorities of the European 
Parliament with a view to the IGC. 
In the report adopted on 17 May 1995, a number of concrete proposals are 
made to make the Union operate more efficiently, democratically, transparently 
and coherently. With a view to enlargement the most important are: 
a) The Commission 
There should continue to be at least one Commissioner per Member 
State; however, the Commission· s structure and composition must be 
adapted to its new tasks and to the need of enlargement if its collegiate 
responsibility and effectiveness are to be maintained. 
This could be done by: 
a greater presidentialization of working methods; 
an internal restructuring of the Commission. 
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b) The Council 
The present system of six-month Presidencies of the Council and the 
European Council should be maintained, but there should be greater 
flexibility in their operation. 
Further extension of qualified majority voting is required if the EU is to 
function effectively. For certain areas of particular sensitivity, unanimity 
will remain necessary, i.e. Treaty amendment, "constitutional decisions" 
(enlargement, own resources, uniform electoral system) and Article 235. 
The system of voting within the Council may need to be adjusted. 
However, this should not be done on the basis of a "double majority" of 
States and population. 
c) The European Parliament 
The number of Members of the European Parliament cannot be 
indefinitely increased and should not exceed 700. 
d) The European Court of Justice 
More flexible internal operating arrangements should be introduced to 
permit the Court of Justice and the Court of the First Instance to face 
up to the increase in their workload and the prospect of enlargement. 
The Parliament believes that in view of the increasing diversity of the EU, 
further flexible arrangements may well be required in the future, but these: 
a) should not undermine the single institutional framework, the "acquis 
communautaire" or the principles of solidarity and economic and social 
cohesion throughout the EU; 
b) should not undermine the principle of equality of all States and citizens 
of the Union before the Treaty; 
c) should not lead to a "Europe a Ia carte"; 
"Parliament reserves the right to put forward any proposals which may prove 
necessary in order to take better account of the implications of the 
enlargement including the financial prospects of enlargement and not to 
undermine the principles of competition, cooperation and solidarity which have 
always been fundamental to European integration." 
In its resolution of 1 3 March 1 996 the Parliament reaffirms and reiterates its 
aforementioned resolution of 1 7 May 1 995 as the basis of its position on the 
IGC. 
3. Positions of the Member States 
3.1 Austria 
Sources: Guidelines (of the Austrian government) on the subjects likely to be dealt 
with at the 1996 IGC; 1996 IGC - basic position of Austria (28 March 1 996) 
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The Austrian Policy papers indicate that: 
in the context of Union enlargement institutional reform is necessary to 
consolidate and strengthen the Community· s capacity to act and the efficiency 
of action in the field of economic, social and environmental policy; 
with regard to models for differentiated integration, the guidelines single out 
four principles to be observed: 
a) differentiated integration should remain the exception not the rule: 
phased integration should be the model to follow; 
b) in the case of phased integration, the goals for EU integration should be 
determined in common. With regard to the institutional aspects of 
phased integration, the guidelines favour the use of a single institutional 
framework; 
c) differentiated integration should not be allowed in political areas where 
certain Member States wish to secure competitive advantages; 
d) the different levels of integration should remain open to those Member 
States not taking part. Agreements establishing integration at various 
levels should include transitional agreements. 
3.2 Belgium 
Sources: Government policy paper to the Belgian Parliament on the 1996 IGC 
(28.7.1995); "Memorandum" of the Benelux countries for the 1996 IGC (March 
1996) 
According to the Policy paper of the Belgian Government: 
during the IGC Belgium will be guided primarily by its wish to consolidate the 
Union; 
consolidation should enable the Union to continue to expand without risking 
dissolution or compromising economy and monetary union. With this in mind, 
and with regard to the institutional adjustments required for expansion, 
Belgium assumes that each country will have to be able to have a say in the 
decision-making process which will thus need to improve its efficiency; 
the Union should first adapt its working methods, and its policies cannot be 
extrapolated unconditionally as regards their substance; 
the IGC is not the forum for discussing renegotiation of the Union • s system 
of finance and enlargement must be incorporated. not by dismantling any 
existing policies but by introducing special transitional measures in the final 
accession Treaties; 
the new Member States will have to accept the "acquis communautaire" in its 
entirety and share all of the Unions· s objectives, if necessary by setting up a 
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multi-speed arrangement managed by the Commission; 
the Belgium Government rejects the idea of "Europe a Ia carte". With regard 
to models for differentiated integration, Belgium singles out the following 
principles to be observed: 
a) differentiation is not an end in itself but a last resort to protect the 
progress of integration from any veto; 
b) it should create a "traction effect"; 
c) the target scope of differentiation must be-carefully selected and suited 
to the task; 
d) institutional derogations must be minimised; 
e) the efficient operation of the market must not be compromised; 
Belgium emphasises this position within the "Memorandum" of the three 
Benelux countries. According to this paper the following additional 
principles have to be observed: 
compatibility with the objectives of the Treaty on EU; 
central role of the Commission in applying the criteria and the 
modalities concerning the differentiated integration;) 
on preparations for enlargement, the Belgian Government considers that the 
applicant countries should make similar efforts to comply with the conditions 
for accession laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 
with regard to arrangements for democracy and the market economy. The EU 
should also be preparing for enlargement, and here the paper proposes 
transitional mechanisms for a limited period and subject to certain criteria. 
3.3 Denmark 
Sources: Agenda for Europe: the 1996 IGC. Report of the Danish Foreign Ministry, 
June 1995; Basis for negotiations- Open Europe: the 1996 IGC ( 11 December 1995) 
Denmark has a political, economic and security-policy interest in seeing the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe become part of the EU. Enlargement 
can help to consolidate democracy in these countries. On the economic level, 
enlargement will lead to sustained progress throughout Europe by increasing 
trade. Enlargement will also provide the basis for greater cross-frontier 
cooperation on common problems. This applies particularly to the environment, 
where there is a need for greater effort. 
The IGC must above all lay the foundations for the enlargement. Therefore the 
Treaty must be adapted so that enlargement can become a permanent and 
effective EU cooperation. In addition, there will be a need after the IGC for 
reforms in a number of specific areas, e.g. agricultural and structural policies. 
The Danish Government intends to work for a result at the IGC which will 
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make it possible to embark with all speed on negotiations for the accession of 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States. 
After the IGC, accession negotiations with the applicant countries should all 
begin at the same time. 
Denmark will try to ensure that when the time comes transitional agreements 
are made which take account of the particular conditions in these countries 
and give them increasing access to EU markets. 
3.4 Finland 
Sources: Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry of 18 September 1995 on the views· 
of the Finnish Government concerning the 1996 IGC; Initial considerations and 
objectives of the Finnish Government for the 1996 IGC of 27 February 1996 
The Finnish Government is of the view that: 
one of the areas where results should be achieved is enabling the Union to 
function better and to prepare it for enlargement; 
therefore institutional changes will be needed; 
the objectives for the Union's development and the timetable this will require 
should be defined jointly, respecting the right of all the Union's Member States 
to take part in the decision-making process on an equal footing. The EU cannot 
be based on differing classes of membership.The Member States may only in 
exceptional cases decide by common agreement that a given country should 
observe a different speed or timetable in its progress towards fulfilment of the 
jointly agreed objectives; 
concerning differentiated integration the Finnish government supports the 
proposals put forward by the .Reflection Group. 
3.5 France 
Sources: Proposals put forward by President Chirac during his presidential campaign; 
Letter from the President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac, and the Chancellor 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Kohl (6 December 1995); "Orientations 
of France for the IGC" - published in the "Figaro" on 20 February 1996; "Common 
Foreign and Security Policy"- Guidelines adopted by the Foreign Ministers of France 
and Germany on 27 February 1996;· Governmental Declaration on the IG"C of ·13 
March 1996 by Michel Barnier, Minister for European Affairs 
With regard to the fact that accession negotiations with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe cannot start without a previous institutional reform 
of the EU, France is very keen for the IGC to be as short as possible and 
concentrate on the essential items of institutional reform in order to avoid a 
delay of the political integration of Europe. Therefore, France has established 
the following three priorities: 
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a) to reform the institutions of the EU with a view to enlargement; 
b) to bring the Union closer to its citizens; 
c) to create a true common foreign and security policy. 
The French Government proposes several institutional changes. According to 
the governmental declaration the institutions of the EU should become more 
democratic, more transparent and more close to the national parliaments and 
the citizen. Furthermore, the French Government believes that in order to 
prepare the EU for·entargement·reinforced cooperation between some of the 
Member States should be permitted. 
This position is shared by President Chirac. During his presidential campaign 
he proposed: "European integration must spread eastward, very rapidly and 
without fail. The EU which today has fifteen members and tomorrow will have 
been enlarged to include twenty or thirty members, must continue to form the 
foundations of the European edifice. 
Within the founding family that is the Union, those Member States which so 
wish must be in a position to forge special bonds and reinforced forms of 
solidarity .... Member States which wish to go faster and further together must 
be allowed to do so .... I would add that once these strengthened joint actions 
have been launched, they will be open to such Member States as might be 
willing and able to take part." 
The accession negotiations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
are supposed to commence in 1998. 
3.6 Germany 
Sources: Coalition agreement of the government parties - CDU, CSU, FDP - of 11 
November 1994 for the current legislative period; Joint declaration of 15 July 1995 
by the German and Italian Foreign Ministers regarding the 1996 IGC; Letter from the 
President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac, and the Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Helmut Kohl (6 December 1995); "Common Foreign and 
Security Policy"- Guidelines adopted by the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany 
on 27 February 1996; "German objectives for the IGC" (26 March 1996) 
Moreover, particular mention should be made of the proposals presented by the 
CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag as the political .and parliamentary base .of the 
present government led by Helmut Kohl:·-
Manifesto of the CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag of 1 September 1994; Discussion 
paper on strengthening the E~ropean Union· s ability to act in the field of CFSP of 13 
June 1995 
According to the German policy paper of 26 March 1996, which refers to the 
coalition agreement of the government parties and the letter of Jacques Chirac 
and Helmut Kohl of 6 December 1995, with a view to enlargement the IGC 
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should focus on a few priority objectives such as the institutional reform of the 
EU and the introduction of a system of "differentiated integration". 
On the question of "differentiated integration", the German Government 
believes that all Member States should be able to participate on the same 
terms in the progress of European integration. However, where one of the 
partners faces temporary difficulties in keeping up with the pace of progress 
in the Union, it would be desirable and feasible to introduce a general clause 
in the Treaties enabling those Member States which have the will and the 
capacity to do so t~ develop closer cooperation among themselves within the· 
single institutional framework of the Union. 
The Manifesto of the COU/CSU group in the Bundestag proposes a 
wide-ranging reform of the EU aimed at making its institutions more democratic 
and making it possible for new members from the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe to join in the near future. 
The Manifesto also advocates a multi-speed Europe and states that a key aim 
would be to move Germany away from the dangers of nationalism and 
transform it into a focus of stability at the heart of Europe. The process of 
integration should be led by a "hard core" of five states (Germany, France, The 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), with cooperation focusing on the new 
policies set down in the Treaty on EU. This "hard core" would be open to other 
Member States such as Spain, Italy, and Great Britain once they had resolved 
"current problems" and if they wished to take part in the project. 
Several countries of Central and Eastern might join the EU around the year 
2000. 
3.7 Greece 
Sources: "Towards a citizens' Europe- democracy and development": memorandum 
for the 1996 IGC (January 1995); Conclusions of the inter-ministerial committee of 
the Greek Government (Athens, June 1995); Memorandum of the Greek Government 
of 24 January 1996 for the IGC: positions and reflections of Greece; "For a 
democratic European Union with Political and Social Content" -Greece· s Contribution 
to the 1996 IGC (Athens, 22 March 1996). 
One of the main objectives of the Greek Government is to ensure the 
institutional, political and economic conditions necessary for the EU • s 
successful enlargement to Cyprus, Malta and the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. In the view of the Greek Government there ·is an 'imminent 
need to reform and further develop the institutional system of the EU in order 
to make it more democratic, efficient and transparent, while also c'apable of 
facing the challenges of the future enlargement. The development and 
adjustment of the institutional system must be based on certain basic 
principles, including: 
institutional unity and equality of all member states/reinforcement of the 
single institutional framework. 
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the preservation of the basic institutional balance, as has been shaped 
by the Treaties and historical experience. 
the preservation of the institutional, legal and political "acquis 
communautaire". 
Greece opposes any notion of a two- or three-speed Europe, such as the notion 
of "differentiated" or "flexible" integration, a "multi-speed" Europe, or a "hard 
core" Europe. It will not accept any proposals contrary to the principle of the 
equal rights and duties of all the peoples of Europe, and especially not in the 
economic field. Total opposition is expressed to any idea of allowing new 
Member States to join and then relegating them to second-class status. 
Greece believes that the method of "temporary transitional provisions" which 
is provided for in the Treaty and has been successfully tested is the answer to 
the problems posed by the need for a deepening of the unification and 
enlargement process. This is the method which ensures the unity of goals as 
well as institutional unity and contributes to the cohesion of the EU without 
hindering the acceleration of unification; 
enlargement should not be a pretext for the reversal of the economic and social 
conditions that support the present equilibrium within the EU. Enlargement 
must be associated with the issue of own resources in cases where the 
accession of certain countries will cause excessive pressure on the Community 
budget and Funds; 
new Member States must respect human rights, constitutional democracy and 
free competition. 
3.8 Ireland 
Source: "Challenges and opportunities abroad" -White Paper on foreign policy (March 
1996) 
The Irish Government considers that enlargement will enhance European 
stability and confidence and, in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, open 
up new markets with significant potential. However, the Government would 
not accept an enlargement process which altered the essential character of the 
Union to that of an expanded free trade area. 
With a view to enlargement an institutional reform of the EU will be needed. 
Some degree of flexibility in the process of integration may be necessary ih 
order to ensure that the · new Member States can be absorbed without 
hindering the continued development of the Union. However Ireland would be 
firmly opposed to proposals leading to the creation of an exclusive hard core 
of Member States which would result in the fragmentation of the Union and 
work to the detriment of its coherence. 
The timing of accession by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will 
depend on a number of factors, most notably: 
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the date of the completion of the IGC; 
the pace and complexity of enlargement negotiations; 
the capacity of the applicants to assume the demands of membership. 
Conditions which must be met by candidate states include the achievement of 
stable democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of 
minorities; the existing of a functioning market economy; and the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. · 
It is likely that some applicants will be members of the Union early in. the next 
decade. But it is most unlikely that all of the countries concerned will accede 
to the Union at the same time. Each application for membership will be 
considered on its own merits. 
3.9 Italy 
Sources: Italian Government statement of 23 February 1995 on foreign policy 
guidelines; Italian Government statement of 23 May 1995 on the IGC to review the 
Maastricht Treaty; Joint declaration of 15 July 1995 by the German and Italian 
Foreign Ministers regarding the 1996 IGC; Position of the Italian Government on the 
IGC for the revision of the Treaties ( 18 March 1996) 
The Italian Government believes that the success of the IGC is a prerequisite 
for future enlargement of the Union. 
It considers that the gradual adoption of Community legislation by Central and 
Eastern European countries is a matter requiring careful attention and that the 
Union should likewise seek to foster integration by developing basic facilities 
and intensifying cooperation. 
Some policies, in particular the commo·n agricultural policy, will need to be 
revised and adjusted. 
The institutional system will need to be adjusted as well to the requirements 
of a Union that has fifteen members and is likely to be further enlarged. Within 
this framework, priority must be given to assessing the operation and 
composition of the Institutions and bodies of the Union, and simplifying the 
Treaty and the procedures laid down in it. 
With regard to differentiated integration, Italy notes that it will be difficult to 
avoid arrangements of this kind for the new policies (foreign and security 
policy and justice and home affairs) where countries will move at different 
speeds although towards the same goal. Differentiated integration will be the 
key for resolving the dilemma over deepening and widening, in other words, 
between unity and flexibility. Certain conditions must be set if integration is to 
proceed at different speeds, including first and foremost the principle of 
institutional unity. A further necessary condition must be the preservation of 
the "acquis communautaire". 
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3.10 Luxembourg 
Sources: Luxembourg Government memorandum of 30 June 1995 on the 1996 IGC; 
"Memorandum" of the Benelux countries for the 1996 IGC (March 1996) 
Luxembourg accepts that, for reasons recognized as objectively valid by the 
Commission and the Council, some member states may wish to move at a 
different speed from others. It believes that different speeds of integration will 
be inevitable in the event of future enlargement. However, this phenomenon 
should be viewed in the light of the 1976 Tindemans report, in other words not 
as a "Europe a Ia carte", since all are agreed on the final objective to be 
achieved in common and are therefore committed to it. 
(Concerning the common position of the three Benelux countries see also 3.2) 
3.11 The Netherlands 
Sources: Note on the enlargement of the EU: the opportunities and obstacles 
(published November 1994 and debated in Parliament February 1995); 
"Memorandum" of the Benelux countries for the 1996 IGC (March 1996) 
Eastern enlargement should happen as soon as possible, whilst safeguarding 
the Union's cohesion and stability, and after the appropriate and institutional 
adjustments have been made. As regards its attitude towards future accession 
negotiations, the Dutch Government announces that it will be guided not only 
by the objective of safeguarding cultural values but also by the democratic 
principles and fundamental rights set out in the Treaty on EU, subject to the 
following four aims: 
a) the achievement in Central and Eastern Europe of a stable security 
policy, socio-economic development and democratic stability; 
b) the maintenance of Germany's active participation in the process of 
European integration, as well as in the joint European and Atlantic 
security structures; 
c) the maintenance of the internal market and a common legal system, and 
hence a European Union capable of acting decisively; 
d) the achievement of the above objectives at a reasonable cost. 
(Concerning the common position -of the three Benelux countries see also 3. 2) 
3.12 Portugal 
Source: "Portugal and the IGC for the revision of the Treaty on EU". Document 
published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 1996 
Portugal gives its support to the final objective of extending the process of 
integration to the East and South. 
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With a view to enlargement the IGC must essentially endeavour to guarantee 
efficient, cohesive and integrated action by a Union enlarged to a large number 
of new Member States. 
Portugal believes it to be of the utmost importance that any readjustment of 
the Institutions, of its mechanisms and procedures should preserve the 
essential institutional balance, the single institutional framework and that it 
should respect the principle of the participation of all the Member States in the 
Union· s decision-making process. 
Portugal is against the in-troduction of ~·system .of differentiated integration: 
The institutionalisation of a possible "hard core" of States which would 
continue the integration process, deepening or broadening it, while others,· 
which would not be able or wish to advance in all fields at the same rate 
would be pushed aside, would introduce a de facto dualism into the process, 
which would be hardly compatible with the joint progress in solidarity which 
the process of EU has always presupposed. 
A model of this type could only stand a chance of being viable if the final 
objective to be reached together were defined and agreed by all and only if its 
implementation were temporarily spread out over a period of time, while 
respecting always the single institutional framework of the Union. That would 
mean that the whole system was governed by clear rules, established a priori 
and by all. For each of those fields in which asymmetrical progress might take 
place, criteria would be determined, which, once reached, would imply full and 
immediate participation in the areas in question. Special mechanisms could also 
be set up to support States which were temporarily not able to bind 
themselves to all the policies. 
3.13 Spain 
Sources: Spain and the 1996 IGC - document on the 1996 IGC: starting points for 
a discussion (presented in March 1995); Reflection paper of 4 July 1995 on the WEU 
-Contributions to the 1996 IGC; "Elements of a S_panish position to the 1996 IGC" 
{28 March 1996) 
The Spanish Government states that the next enlargement is a political 
imperative, as well as a new opportunity for Europe. 
Spain believes that the major issue is neither when enlargement should happen 
(after the end of the IGC) nor which countries -should be admitted·· (the 
republics of the former USSR are not 'Considered eligible, at least undet present 
circumstances, with the exception of the Baltic republics), but rather how 
enlargement should take place. Enlargement will require both a genuine 
deepening of the EU via the IGC and the resolution of the problems which will 
arise in its wake. 
Spain considers the concepts of "variable geometry" or "reinforced solidarity" 
to be the most practical means of superseding the antithesis between widening 
and deepening of the Union. Any such compromise would, however, be 
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subject to the following conditions: 
a) case-by-case authorisation; 
b) "last resort" status; 
c) openness to all; 
d) temporariness of the differences in the degree of integration; 
e) the existence of accompanying measures to strengthen g1obal coherence 
and ensure the convergence of those lagging behind; 
f) preservation of the entire "acquis communautaire"; 
g) retention of the single institutional framework; 
h) compatibility with political stability in Europe. 
Spain rejects any system of differentiated integration which might lead to a 
II Europe a Ia carte". 
3.14 Sweden 
Sources: Note of July 1995 on the fundamental interests of Sweden with a view to 
the 1996 IGC; Report of the Swedish Government of 30 November 1995 
Sweden has a great interest in enlarging the EU towards the East and thinks 
that once the Conference is completed the negotiations for enlargement should 
begin with a large number of countries at the same time and should be 
completed as each respective country is fully prepared for accession. It is 
particularly important to Sweden that the Baltic States should be treated in the 
same way as the other Central and Eastern European countries. 
On the institutional question, Sweden considers that enlargement should be 
backed up by strengthening cooperation to give the EU the necessary capacity 
to take decisions and formulate policy both internally and in the international 
sphere, on matters relating to foreign, security or commercial policies; 
The various concepts of differentiated integration should not be discarded 
automatically, since they allow-a degree of flexibility which could be necessary 
to strengthen cooperation. "Europe a Ia carte" does not interest Sweden as it 
could damage the opportunities for bringing about the advantages of the single 
market. 
3. 15 United Kingdom 
Sources: White Paper of the British Government of 12 March 1996: "A Partnership 
of Nations"- the British approach to the European Union Intergovernmental 
Conference 1996; Statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
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Commonwealth Affairs, Malcolm Rifkind, on the White Paper of 12 March 1996 
The British Government believes that the IGC is clearly important for the EU · s 
future. But in the view of the United Kingdom it is not the only, or perhaps 
even the most important, challenge which the Union faces. 
Outside the scope of the IGC, the Member States must prepare for the 
enlargement of the Union to the East and South. That will involve reforming 
the Community· s agricultural and regional policies. Meanwhile, the Member 
States cannot ignor~ the urgent need to strengthen Europe· s competitiveness-
and thereby generate new jobs. There will also be hard choices. to make on a 
single currency and on the Union· s future financing. In the· view of. the British 
government these critically important matters do not fall.within the scope of 
the IGC. 
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom proposes several institutional changes with 
a view to enlargement. According to the White Paper the Member States 
should argue constructively for Treaty changes to improve the operation of the 
Union, so that Europe can face and overcome the challenges ahead and, in 
particular, enlargement; 
The British Government believes that, especially with the prospect of 
enlargement, the EU should be able to respond more sensitively to the needs 
of an increasingly diverse membership. According to the White Paper the Union 
needs to accept a degree of flexibility or, as it is sometimes described, 
"variable geometry", without falling into the trap of a two-tier Europe with a 
hard core either of countries or of policies. Conformity should never be sought 
for its own sake. There may be areas in which it is perfectly healthy for some 
Member States to integrate more closely or more quickly than others. 
According to the White Paper it is however important that such policies only 
become Union policies, and draw on the Community· s institutions, including 
the budget, where this is agreed by all. In addition, no Member State should 
be excluded from an area of policy in which it wants to participate, and is 
qualified to do so. 
4. Positions of the States of Central and Eastern Europe 
4. 1 Bulgaria 
Source: "Position Paper" of the delegation of the Republic-of Bulgaria for the second 
meeting of the Association Council Bulgaria - EU ("24 January 1996) 
Bulgaria shares the view that accession negotiations with the Central and 
Eastern European countries should commence immediately and simultaneously 
after the IGC. In Bulgaria· s view it is of the utmost importance that the 
principle of starting on an equal footing should be observed in the course of 
the accession process. Bulgaria welcomes the decision of the Madrid Council 
that all Central and Eastern European countries shall be regularly informed 
about the progress of the IGC at special meetings every two months and 
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believes that this mechanism will work effectively. 
4.2 Czech Republic 
Source: "Memorandum" of the government of the Czech Republic presented with the 
application for membership of the Union on 23 January 1996 
The Czech Republic sees its future in membership of the EU such as it is and 
such as it will be shaped by the collective wisdom of its Member States in the 
months and years to come. The Government of the Czech Republic will oe 
prepared to accept the "acquis communautaire" .and the level of integration · 
achieved by the EU at the time of accession of the Czech Republic .. 
4.3 Estonia 
Source: "Aide Memoire" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia (22 November 
1995) 
Estonia believes that the 1996 IGC should primarily concentrate on the 
institutional reform preceding enlargement of the EU; the reviewing of the 
policies of the EU in different spheres should take place within the framework 
of the regular activity of the Union and after the 1996 Conference. Estonia is 
interested in a swift and productive IGC and in the subsequent commencement 
of accession negotiations with all prospective Member States six months after 
the end of the IGC; 
Estonia proposes several political and institutional changes: 
a) Institutional changes 
aa) Council 
The Council should remain an institution where the role and 
importance of Member States· would be defined as much as 
possible on the basis of sovereign equality. With regard to the 
decision-making process Estonia believes that in order to make 
the activity of the EU more efficient proposals to reduce the 
number of decisions to be decided unanimously are justified. In 
Estonia · s view it is also necessary to find new working methods 
for the Council. Concerning the Presidency of the Council Estonia 
supports a collective, one year Presidency, where, in principle, all 
participating Member-States are treated equally; 
ab) Commission· 
Estonia holds that each Member State should be represented by 
one Commissioner; 
ac) The European Court of Justice 
An enlargement of the competence of the European Court of 
Justice to include, in addition to the present first pillar, Justice 
and Home Affairs; 
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b) The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU 
With respect to CFSP procedures, Estonia believes that the topics of the 
second pillar should remain in the competence of the sovereign Member 
States and the rule of taking decisions on issues of vital national interest 
by consensus should be maintained. To guarantee the more efficient 
planning of CFSP and the carrying out of decisions, Estonia supports the 
formation of a unit of planning and analysis in the Secretariat General of 
the Council. 
A qualified majority may be considered sufficient for certain issues, 
especially ones concerning the implementation of-decisions made on the 
principle of consensus. 
c) Comitology and the hierarchy of the EU laws 
4.4 Hungary 
Estonia considers that the IGC must resolve the difficulties that have 
appeared in the so-called comitology system, according to which the 
Council has delegated executive power for implementing EU legislation 
to the Commission and supervises this implementation through 
committees and working groups of representatives of Member States. 
To simplify this mechanism it would seem appropriate to give more 
executive independence to the Commission, while taking into 
consideration the supervisory role of the Member States. 
Source: No official document published 
4.5 Latvia 
Source: No official document published; however, based on the expressed opinions 
of Member States, material prepared by the Reflection Group and the current political 
situation in Europe, Latvian governmental experts have established a preliminary 
standpoint 
During further evolution of the EU, institutional and political reforms are not 
excluded, but the following three principles will remain: 
a) the IGC should concentrate on institutional reforms while not 
overshadowing the political urgency of enlargement; 
b) accession negotiations should start with all prospective Member States 
simultaneously after the end of the working sessions of the IGC; 
c) the model of integration should anticipate the ac;:quisition of full member 
state status. Potential participation within different common initiatives 
should be determined by the readiness of each individual country to fulfil 
the necessary criteria; 
Latvia proposes several institutional and political changes: 
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a) Institutional reform 
aa) Council 
The voting system in the Council could be reformed in 
accordance with the "double majority" principle, where the first 
criterion would be a qualified majority, taking into account 
representation of the population, while the second criterion would 
represent the interests of small countries by granting one vote to 
each Member State. 
Unanimity should be preserved on iss-ues concerning annexes and 
changes to the Treaties, as well as on questions-of-enlargement. 
The revised system of the Presidency should be based on groups 
of countries on a regional basis, including both small and large 
countries. In each Presidency countries from the Northern, the 
Southern and, for example, the Central-Eastern region of the EU 
should be included. 
The term of the Presidency could be extended to 18 months and 
decisions of the Presidency group, which will probably contain 4-
5 states, should be taken by majority. 
ab) Commission 
Each Member State should be represented by one Commissioner. 
However, the establishment of a fixed number would be 
acceptable. Some members could become Deputy 
Commissioners. 
ac) Parliament 
A fixed number of seats (not exceeding 750) would be efficient. 
Changes in the existing representation should be made by 
proportionally decreasing the number of parliamentarians from 
each Member State. 
ad) European Court of Justice 
Each Member State should have the right to its own 
representative in the Court of Justice. Latvia supports the 
extension of the competence of the Court of Justice. 
b) Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Latvia supports two possible improvements: 
the introduction of the principle of "positive abstention"; 
the broadening of the application of qualified majority voting 
where unanimity currently applies, which would strengthen the 
idea of closer political union. 
Moreover, Latvia supports the creation of a CFSP planning and 
analysis unit located within the Secretariat of the Council, in 
which the representatives from the Commission would also take 
part. 
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4. 6 Lithuania 
Source: No official paper published. However, there is a unofficial document (non 
paper) concerning the 1996 IGC drafted by Lithuanian governmental experts 
According to this non-paper, EU enlargement and the problems directly related 
to enlargement are the most important issues for Lithuania in the context of 
the 1996 IGC. Among the issues to which Lithuania attaches particular 
significance are institutional reform, the strengthening of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and questions of security and defence policies _ 
- -(EU/WEU/NATO relations). 
Lithuania believes that EU enlargement is an essential factor for political and 
economic security and stability in Europe. It expects the 1996 IGC to prepare 
the Union for enlargement. In this context, Lithuania proposes institutional and 
political changes: 
a) Institutional reform 
Lithuania would support the extension of qualified majority voting with 
regard to matters which do not affect vital interests of the EU Member 
States. It would also support the introduction of the principle of 
II positive abstention II; 
b) Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Lithuania supports the creation of a planning, analysis and evaluation 
body. 
Lithuania anticipates that accession negotiations with all associated countries 
will commence six months after the end of the IGC, irrespective of its success. 
The beginning of the negotiations should not be related to the ratification of 
the results of the IGC. 
Taking into account the need to encourage the process of EU enlargement, 
accession negotiations should not last long and should lead to full EU 
membership of the associated countries with transitional periods in the first 
Community pillar if required and full participation in the second and third EU 
pillars from the date of signing the accession agreements. 
4.7 Poland 
Source: No official document published. However, there is.an unoffici_al document 
concerning the Polish position on the IGC drafted by Polish governmental experts 
Poland has high hopes and expectations of the IGC. According to the non-
paper, the implementation of the basic objectives of the Conference is going 
to have an impact on the Union· s capacity to cope with the challenges before 
it, especially those of further enlargement. The Conference also has crucial 
importance for the interests as well as prospects of Poland as a country 
aspiring to EU membership. Poland believes that the measure of the success 
of the Conference will be the creation of conditions allowing admission to the 
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EU of all the candidate countries. Poland reckons that, in accordance with 
assurances made, the membership negotiations will start at the latest six 
months after the conclusion of the IGC. 
Poland proposes several political and institutional changes: 
a) Institutional reform 
aa) Representation in the EU institutions 
Poland favours retaining the existing decision-making mechanism 
while taking account of the growing number of participants. 
Cohesion of the EU requires each Member State to have its own 
Commissioner. A ceiling on the number of deputies to the 
Parliament should be imposed as well. 
ab) Council 
The enlargement of qualified majority voting should take place on 
a case-by-case basis. 
ac) Commission 
Constant verification of the scope of the Commission· s executive 
authority is needed. 
b) Common Foreign and Security Policy 
The CFSP, while remaining intergovernmental, should obtain procedural 
and financial support ensuring effective internal co-operation and more 
rapid decision-making on policy matters with regard to third states. A 
better co-ordination of external economic relations (Pillar I) and political 
relations (Pillar II) is needed. Poland supports the project to create a 
common policy analysis unit for the CFSP as an intellectual and 
organisational support for further co-operation. 
c) Co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs 
Efforts should be made to simplify the institutional hierarchy of the Third 
Pillar. Poland believes that issues connected with justice (e.g. criminal 
prosecution) should be resolved at national level. 
d) Europe closer to its citizens 
da) Subsidiarity 
A mechanism to monitor its implementation should be created. 
db) Transparency 
Citizens should be given broader information about the principles 
on which the EU functions. 
de) Solidarity . · 
It should ensure opportunities to participate in EU activities for 
more and less developed countries alike.· 
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4.8 Romania 
Source: A Romanian view on the 1996 IGC and the enlargement process (published 
by the Romanian government) 
According to the government· s paper, the IGC is seen by Romania as a turning 
point which will greatly affect Romania· s future, since it will ultimately create 
the conditions to allow the Union to accommodate and to integrate the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Although the issue of enlargement does not appear as a separate item· on the 
agenda of the_IGC, Romania believes that it will underpin the entire debate and 
the final outcome of the JGC. · 
Romania shares the views expressed in the Commission · s contribution to the 
IGC that enlargement and deepening are two perfectly compatible processes 
and that a construction based on solidarity and openness is not destined to 
weaken or dilute the Union. 
A major task of the IGC should be the adaption of the EU institutions for 
enlargement and making them ready for transitional arrangements. In this 
context Romania stresses that the institutional balance established through the 
provisions of the Treaty on the EU is a good one and that it does not need 
major changes or adjustments. Nevertheless, Romania believes in the need for 
increased transparency and democracy in the activities and functioning of the 
institutions. 
Moreover, it expresses its expectations of political changes in the second and 
third Pillars: 
a) Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Romania also calls for the establishment of a centre for policy analysis 
and planning, at the conceptual level, that would ensure a longer term 
focus for and coherence of the goals pursued. 
b) Justice and Home Affairs 
Romania· s concern in this area would be that whatever the final . 
decisions on the further harmonization of immigration and asylum 
policies and on a common approach to specific civil and criminal 
matters, these decisions should under no circumstance create new 
restrictions on the freedom of movement of. Romanian citizens. 
Furthermore, Romania believes that, while adapting its instjtutions, 
mechanisms and policies with the prospect of enlargement of the EU, the IGC 
should avoid establishing new criteria for accession or the setting up of new 
institutions which could delay the accession. 
The issue of the final costs of enlargement and its impact on the common 
policies should not burden the IGC agenda and under no circumstance should 
it become a matter of overriding concern that would cause the IGC to miss the 
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goal of reuniting an artificially divided continent; 
Romania believes that the first round of negotiations should involve all 
associated countries that officially applied for accession and would generally 
meet the criteria for full membership. Subsequently, a certain degree of 
flexibility would have to be applied to cope with the differences between the 
prospective member states, either in the form of differentiated transition 
periods or in the form of a variable speed membership. 
4.9 Slovakia 
Source: Position paper of the Slovak Republic for the second Slovak Republic - EU 
Association Council Meeting (27 February 1 996) 
The 1 996 IGC is expected to adopt decisions of considerable gravity on a 
number of issues related to improving the effectiveness of Union activities and 
to its adaption to a new world order. 
The Slovak Republic believes that talks with associated countries of Eastern 
Europe will commence as early as possible after the conclusion of the 1 996 
IGC. 
Slovakia acknowledges that the simultaneous commencement of the 
discussions need not and, because of objective reasons, cannot mean identical 
progress and results. It is in its interest to be among those associated countries 
that proceed at the most rapid pace. 
4. 1 0 Slovenia 
Source: Slovenia has not published an official document on the IGC. However, the 
Slovenian Government has adopted a position for consideration by the Slovenian 
Parliament, which will look at the question of full membership of Slovenia in the EU 
at an extraordinary session, scheduled for the begin-ning of April. 
According to this proposal the objective of the Republic of Slovenia is to 
achieve full membership of the European Union. 
In the view of Slovenia this would be the best case scenario for the social and 
economic development of the country, for the strengthening of its identity and 
for the assertion of fundamental national interests within a wider, stable and 
open Europe; 
The Slovenian Government will thus continue its efforts to ensure as soon as 
possible the signing of the· Association Agreement both as an intermediate 
stage towards full membership of the EU and as an indispensable institutional 
framework for the integration of the Republic of Slovenia in implementing the 
pre-accession strategy prepared by the EU. 
If it will not be possible to sign the Association Agreement during the course 
of the Italian Presidency, Slovenia will file an application for full membership 
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of the EU instead, in order to be included among the first group of prospective 
Member States. 
Slovenia envisages full membership of the Union around the year 2001. 
5. Position of the Reflection Group 
Source: Report of 5 December 1995 
According to the report, the next enlargement represents both a political 
imperative and a new opportunity for Europe, but at the same time it presents 
the Union with a major challenge requiring an adequate response: 
a) firstly, in the framework of the IGC, through the reforms designed to 
improve the Union· s functioning in general and institutional reform in 
particular; 
b) secondly, in view of the impact which enlargement will have on 
applicant countries and on the Union. 
The next enlargement will be different from the previous ones because of the 
large number of applicant countries and the heterogeneity of their political, 
economic and social situations. To ensure that the next enlargement does not 
weaken, change the nature of or actually break up the Union, the reforms 
needed to cope with the challenges involved must first be made. 
The enlargement negotiations cannot begin until the IGC has been concluded 
satisfactorily. The success of the former thus depends on the success of the 
latter. 
In order to-enable the Union to work better and to prepare it for enlargement 
the IGC should examine the ways and means to improve the efficiency and 
democracy of the Union. Therefore, the Reflection Group proposes several 
institutional changes: 
a) The Commission 
Concerning the composition of the college the Group identifies basically 
two possible approaches: 
to retain the present system under the Treaty; 
to ascertain the appropriate number of Commissioners to perform 
the Commission· s duties consistently and effectively. They 
would then be fewer than the number of Member States. 
b) The Council 
Unanimity should remain the rule for decisions on primary law. In the 
case of Community legislation, a large majority in the Group is prepared 
to consider making qualified-majority voting the general rule. 
Concerning the Presidency the Group has considered different possible 
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arrangements. One proposal has been the idea of a team-Presidency 
consisting for instance of four Member States acting for a period of at 
least 12 months. 
c) The European Parliament 
In the view of the Reflection Group it seems appropriate to fix a 
maximum number of seats. A majority accept a maximum of 700 in an 
enlarged Union, as the European Parliament itself proposes in its report. 
d) The European Court of Justice 
With a view to enlargement of the Union s-ome take the view that the 
number of Judges should be fewer than the number-of Member States 
in order to ensure efficiency and consistency. Others take the line that 
all States should have a Judge at the Court. A middle course put 
forward is that not only Judges should count but Advocates-General as 
well. 
Concerning differentiated integration the Group rejects any formula which 
could lead to a "Europe a Ia carte". As regards the guidelines to allow 
flexibility, there is a large majority view supporting the following criteria: 
a) flexibility should be allowed only when it serves the Union· s objectives 
and if all other solutions have been ruled out, and on a case-by-case 
basis; 
b) differences in the degree of integration should be temporary; 
c) no-one who so desires and fulfils the necessary conditions previously 
adopted by all can be excluded from full participation in a given action 
or common policy; 
d) provision should be made for ad hoc measures to assist those who want 
to take part in a given action or policy but are temporarily unable to do 
so; 
e) when allowing flexibility the necessary adjustments have to be made to 
maintain the "acquis communautaire", and a common basis should be 
preserved to prevent any sort of retreat from common principles and 
objectives; 
f) a single institutional framework has to be respected, irrespective of the 
structure of the Treaty. 
6. Conclusions 
To summarise the positions of the parties involved in enlargement, clearly there is 
agreement that any conditions concerning eastward enlargement will be discussed 
within the formal negotiations for accession of Central and Eastern European states. 
Therefore, there is a lack of concrete statements regarding conditions for accession 
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which go beyond those conditions already mentioned at the European Council of 
Copenhagen. 
After consultation of all parties involved, the 1996 IGC provides the opportunity to 
prepare the Union for Eastern enlargement. In this context a discussion has evolved 
concerning, in particular, institutional reform as well as modifications to the 
decision-making process. As far as the progress of this discussion is concerned, the 
relevant fact sheets published by the EP's Task Force should be referred to. 
The parties involved have adopted different positions in the area of differentiated 
integration. While a majority of the member states considers a move towa-rds a 
multi-speed Europe as likely and possibly inevitable, others, namely Portugal and 
Greece, reject such an approac_!l. 
No agreement exists about the exact 'Commencement date of the enlargement 
negotiations following the termination of the 1996 IGC. However, according to the 
Presidency Conclusions of the Madrid European Council, the preliminary stage of 
negotiations will probably coincide with the start of negotiations with Cyprus and 
Malta, that is six months after the conclusion of the 1996 IGC. 
* * * * * 
For further information concerning this note, please contact Mr. GOLLAN, DG IV, 
Division for Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, EAS 259, 
Brussels, Tel.: 3701 
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